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Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households?

Celso Brunetti, Jeffrey H. Harris, Ioannis Spyridopoulos

Finance and Economics Discussion Series · 2026-05 · (2026-027) · 1-1

DOI: 10.17016/feds.2026.027 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2026-05. Verfasst von Celso Brunetti und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

No. Using confidential micro-level data combining mortgage contracts with credit and repayment records for 44 million loans spanning 5,000 bank mergers over nearly three decades, we find no changes to mortgage rates, approval rates, or delinquency rates. Local mortgage markets remain remarkably competitive despite consolidation, averaging over 100 active lenders in each county every post-merger quarter. Our findings reveal significant merger selection motives: large acquiring banks target community banks with relationship-intensive, portfolio-lending business models, whereas community banks appear to merge together to gain scale and compete. Overall, our study challenges the view that bank mergers increase market concentration and create market power that harms household borrowers.

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APA

Brunetti, C., Harris, J. H., & Spyridopoulos, I. (2026). Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households?. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1-1. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2026.027

Vancouver

Brunetti C, Harris JH, Spyridopoulos I. Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households?. Finance and Economics Discussion Series. 2026:1-1. doi:10.17016/feds.2026.027

BibTeX
@article{Brunetti2026,
  author = {Brunetti, Celso and Harris, Jeffrey H. and Spyridopoulos, Ioannis},
  title = {Does Banking Consolidation Harm Households?},
  journal = {Finance and Economics Discussion Series},
  year = {2026},
  number = {2026-027},
  pages = {1--1},
  doi = {10.17016/feds.2026.027}
}
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