EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Why Manipulation is Wrong

Massimo Renzo

Political Philosophy · 2025

DOI: 10.16995/pp.17395 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Massimo Renzo. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Philosophers have been paying increasingly more attention to the notion of manipulation. Perhaps surprisingly, however, most of the recent literature has focused on the conceptual question of identifying the features that make certain behaviours instances of manipulation, rather than on the moral question of why manipulation is wrong. Even more surprisingly, philosophers who have addressed the moral question have rejected the traditional view that manipulation is wrong because it undermines our efforts to exercise our practical agency and respond to our reasons for action (Buss, Gibert). In this paper, I offer a defence of the traditional view. In doing so, I vindicate a further idea that is routinely invoked in discussions of manipulation but whose articulation has proved elusive: The idea that one reason manipulation is wrong is that it involves using people as means.

Zitieren

APA

Renzo, M. (2025). Why Manipulation is Wrong. Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.17395

Vancouver

Renzo M. Why Manipulation is Wrong. Political Philosophy. 2025. doi:10.16995/pp.17395

BibTeX
@article{Renzo2025,
  author = {Renzo, Massimo},
  title = {Why Manipulation is Wrong},
  journal = {Political Philosophy},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.16995/pp.17395}
}
Kostenlos starten →