Why Manipulation is Wrong
Political Philosophy · 2025
DOI: 10.16995/pp.17395 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Massimo Renzo. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 52 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Philosophers have been paying increasingly more attention to the notion of manipulation. Perhaps surprisingly, however, most of the recent literature has focused on the conceptual question of identifying the features that make certain behaviours instances of manipulation, rather than on the moral question of why manipulation is wrong. Even more surprisingly, philosophers who have addressed the moral question have rejected the traditional view that manipulation is wrong because it undermines our efforts to exercise our practical agency and respond to our reasons for action (Buss, Gibert). In this paper, I offer a defence of the traditional view. In doing so, I vindicate a further idea that is routinely invoked in discussions of manipulation but whose articulation has proved elusive: The idea that one reason manipulation is wrong is that it involves using people as means.
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APA
Renzo, M. (2025). Why Manipulation is Wrong. Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.17395
Vancouver
Renzo M. Why Manipulation is Wrong. Political Philosophy. 2025. doi:10.16995/pp.17395
BibTeX
@article{Renzo2025,
author = {Renzo, Massimo},
title = {Why Manipulation is Wrong},
journal = {Political Philosophy},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.16995/pp.17395}
}
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