Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof
Political Philosophy · 2025
DOI: 10.16995/pp.17105 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Political Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von J. Colin Bradley und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A recent view in legal epistemology holds that since knowledge is the standard for proof of criminal guilt, and since there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, contrary to current trial practice juries should be told the sentence a defendant would receive if convicted. We argue against this view. First, pragmatic encroachment on legal proof would produce distorted and unjust trial practice. Second, even granting pragmatic encroachment on legal proof would not of itself undermine the basic justification for withholding sentencing evidence from juries. We close on the false allure of epistemology-first arguments for legal reform.
Zitieren
APA
Bradley, J. C., & Gordon-Smith, E. (2025). Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof. Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.17105
Vancouver
Bradley JC, Gordon-Smith E. Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof. Political Philosophy. 2025. doi:10.16995/pp.17105
BibTeX
@article{Bradley2025,
author = {Bradley, J. Colin and Gordon-Smith, Eleanor},
title = {Must Jurors Know the Stakes of Conviction? Sentencing, Encroachment, and Legal Proof},
journal = {Political Philosophy},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.16995/pp.17105}
}
EUVIMED