Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology
Free & Equal: A Journal of Ethics and Public Affairs · 2025
DOI: 10.16995/fe.18062 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Free & Equal: A Journal of Ethics and Public Affairs, 2025. Verfasst von Richard Yetter Chappell. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It’s commonly thought that we can reasonably oppose serious wrongdoing. For example, deontologist bystanders may prefer that an agent allows the killing of five rather than wrongly killing one as a means to saving the five. But this preference turns out to conflict with caring sufficiently strongly, after the one is killed, that the remaining entirely gratuitous killings are successfully prevented. This surprising incompatibility suggests that, whatever view we accept for ourselves, we cannot want others to abide by deontology.
Zitieren
APA
Chappell, R. Y. (2025). Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology. Free & Equal: A Journal of Ethics and Public Affairs. https://doi.org/10.16995/fe.18062
Vancouver
Chappell RY. Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology. Free & Equal: A Journal of Ethics and Public Affairs. 2025. doi:10.16995/fe.18062
BibTeX
@article{Chappell2025,
author = {Chappell, Richard Yetter},
title = {Preference and Prevention: A New Paradox of Deontology},
journal = {Free & Equal: A Journal of Ethics and Public Affairs},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.16995/fe.18062}
}
EUVIMED