EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation

Keith N. Hylton, Max M. Levine

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · 2025 · 181 (NIX)

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2026-0022 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2025. Verfasst von Keith N. Hylton und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and demonstrates a justification for the class action. As the number of victims grows, the incentive to free ride increases and the probability that an individual victim will sue falls to zero. As a result, a potential defendants compliance with lawis never socially optimal, and the shortfall from optimality increases with the number of victims. With class actions, by contrast, undercompliance vanishes as the class size grows. These results suggest a more nuanced and potentially more robust justification for the class action which does not rely on victims having unlitigable negative-value claims.

Zitieren

APA

Hylton, K. N., & Levine, M. M. (2025). Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 181(NIX). https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2026-0022

Vancouver

Hylton KN, Levine MM. Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2025;181(NIX). doi:10.1628/jite-2026-0022

BibTeX
@article{Hylton2025,
  author = {Hylton, Keith N. and Levine, Max M.},
  title = {Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation},
  journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {181},
  number = {NIX},
  doi = {10.1628/jite-2026-0022}
}
Kostenlos starten →