Optimal Licensing and Antitrust Policies in a Cournot Duopoly with an Upstream Monopolist
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · 2025 · 181 (NIX)
DOI: 10.1628/jite-2026-0019 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2025. Verfasst von Madhuri H. Shastry und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We analyse a licensing game in a downstream Cournot duopoly where a key input is supplied by an upstream monopolist. We consider two antitrust constraints: (i) the post-licensing price should not be higher than pre-licensing, and (ii) the fixed fee in the licensing contract must be non-negative. We characterise the optimal licensing strategy between a two-part per-unit royalty contract and a two-part ad valorem profit sharing contract. Further, we analyse the welfare implications of our model under different antitrust constraints and input pricing regimes. We also find a possibility of welfare-reducing licensingin our model.
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APA
Shastry, M. H., & Sinha, U. B. (2025). Optimal Licensing and Antitrust Policies in a Cournot Duopoly with an Upstream Monopolist. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 181(NIX). https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2026-0019
Vancouver
Shastry MH, Sinha UB. Optimal Licensing and Antitrust Policies in a Cournot Duopoly with an Upstream Monopolist. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2025;181(NIX). doi:10.1628/jite-2026-0019
BibTeX
@article{Shastry2025,
author = {Shastry, Madhuri H. and Sinha, Uday Bhanu},
title = {Optimal Licensing and Antitrust Policies in a Cournot Duopoly with an Upstream Monopolist},
journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
year = {2025},
volume = {181},
number = {NIX},
doi = {10.1628/jite-2026-0019}
}
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