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Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability

Julien Jacob, Bruno Lovat

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 182 (3) · 468-494

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0048 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Julien Jacob und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Many industrial accidents result from the actions of multiple agents. This is especially the case where one firm uses an input or a technology supplied by another firm. Both influence the level of risk - either by determining the quality of the input, or by choosing the level of care when putting that input to use. In this paper, we highlight the inefficiencies that may arise from such a setup, and in particular how the vertical market relationship between the two firms may alter their incentives to control risk. To address this, we propose a second-best sharing liability rule, which depends on the relative bargaining power of each firm in the contractual relationship. Our rule calls for collaboration between Courts and regulatory agencies.

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APA

Jacob, J., & Lovat, B. (2026). Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 182(3), 468-494. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0048

Vancouver

Jacob J, Lovat B. Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2026;182(3):468-494. doi:10.1628/jite-2025-0048

BibTeX
@article{Jacob2026,
  author = {Jacob, Julien and Lovat, Bruno},
  title = {Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability},
  journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {182},
  number = {3},
  pages = {468--494},
  doi = {10.1628/jite-2025-0048}
}
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