Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 182 (3) · 468-494
DOI: 10.1628/jite-2025-0048 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Julien Jacob und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many industrial accidents result from the actions of multiple agents. This is especially the case where one firm uses an input or a technology supplied by another firm. Both influence the level of risk - either by determining the quality of the input, or by choosing the level of care when putting that input to use. In this paper, we highlight the inefficiencies that may arise from such a setup, and in particular how the vertical market relationship between the two firms may alter their incentives to control risk. To address this, we propose a second-best sharing liability rule, which depends on the relative bargaining power of each firm in the contractual relationship. Our rule calls for collaboration between Courts and regulatory agencies.
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APA
Jacob, J., & Lovat, B. (2026). Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 182(3), 468-494. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0048
Vancouver
Jacob J, Lovat B. Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2026;182(3):468-494. doi:10.1628/jite-2025-0048
BibTeX
@article{Jacob2026,
author = {Jacob, Julien and Lovat, Bruno},
title = {Multiple Tortfeasors in High-Risk Activities: When Bargain Shapes Liability},
journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {182},
number = {3},
pages = {468--494},
doi = {10.1628/jite-2025-0048}
}
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