Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · 29.07.2026 · 86
DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.19527 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, online erschienen am 29.07.2026. Verfasst von Martin Lackner und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent. Such fairness considerations, however, open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding. By untruthfully opposing a popular opinion in one issue, voters can receive increased consideration in other issues. We study under which conditions this is possible and show that even weak fairness considerations enable free-riding. Additionally, we study free-riding from a computational and experimental point of view. Our results show that free-riding in multi-issue domains is often possible, but comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters. Thus, the allure of free-riding is smaller than one could intuitively assume.
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APA
Lackner, M., Maly, J., & Nardi, O. (2026). Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 86. https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.19527
Vancouver
Lackner M, Maly J, Nardi O. Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 2026;86. doi:10.1613/jair.1.19527
BibTeX
@article{Lackner2026,
author = {Lackner, Martin and Maly, Jan and Nardi, Oliviero},
title = {Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {86},
doi = {10.1613/jair.1.19527}
}
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