Now You See It, Now You Don’t: A Theory of Machine Consciousness Must Explain Illusions
Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series · 18.05.2026 · 8 (1) · 368-370
DOI: 10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42567 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series, online erschienen am 18.05.2026. Verfasst von Gabriel Simmons.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
As machine intelligences become more sophisticated, individuals and societies will encounter myriad attributions of consciousness to machines. Some of these attributions may be correct; many will be illusory. This paper argues that computationalist functionalist theories of machine consciousness can and should seek to explain illusions of machine consciousness. A theory that accounts for illusions reduces the risk of producing false positives---theories that explain merely the appearance of consciousness rather than genuine consciousness. Further, given the consequential nature of consciousness attributions, whether veridical or illusory, such a theory helps society navigate issues of blame and recourse when mistaken attributions cause harm.
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APA
Simmons, G. (2026). Now You See It, Now You Don’t: A Theory of Machine Consciousness Must Explain Illusions. Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series, 8(1), 368-370. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42567
Vancouver
Simmons G. Now You See It, Now You Don’t: A Theory of Machine Consciousness Must Explain Illusions. Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series. 2026;8(1):368-370. doi:10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42567
BibTeX
@article{Simmons2026,
author = {Simmons, Gabriel},
title = {Now You See It, Now You Don’t: A Theory of Machine Consciousness Must Explain Illusions},
journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium Series},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {368--370},
doi = {10.1609/aaaiss.v8i1.42567}
}
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