Voting in Divisible Settings: A Survey
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 14.03.2026 · 40 (46) · 39789-39796
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v40i46.41336 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Warut Suksompong und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Voting is one of the most prominent applications of preference aggregation and computational social choice. While much of the literature focuses on models involving discrete candidates, there has been a growing interest in voting over divisible resources, such as budget, space, and time. In this survey, we review existing work on voting in divisible settings, including fundamental models of budget aggregation, fair mixing, and cake sharing. We also establish connections among these models, highlight unifying themes across different frameworks, and suggest directions for future research.
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APA
Suksompong, W., & Teh, N. (2026). Voting in Divisible Settings: A Survey. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(46), 39789-39796. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i46.41336
Vancouver
Suksompong W, Teh N. Voting in Divisible Settings: A Survey. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2026;40(46):39789-39796. doi:10.1609/aaai.v40i46.41336
BibTeX
@article{Suksompong2026,
author = {Suksompong, Warut and Teh, Nicholas},
title = {Voting in Divisible Settings: A Survey},
journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2026},
volume = {40},
number = {46},
pages = {39789--39796},
doi = {10.1609/aaai.v40i46.41336}
}
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