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Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem

Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Zein Pishbin

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 14.03.2026 · 40 (20) · 17188-17196

DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Georgios Papasotiropoulos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice---such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule---and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation.

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APA

Papasotiropoulos, G., & Pishbin, Z. (2026). Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 17188-17196. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769

Vancouver

Papasotiropoulos G, Pishbin Z. Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2026;40(20):17188-17196. doi:10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769

BibTeX
@article{Papasotiropoulos2026,
  author = {Papasotiropoulos, Georgios and Pishbin, Zein},
  title = {Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem},
  journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {40},
  number = {20},
  pages = {17188--17196},
  doi = {10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769}
}
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