Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 14.03.2026 · 40 (20) · 17188-17196
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Georgios Papasotiropoulos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice---such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule---and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation.
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APA
Papasotiropoulos, G., & Pishbin, Z. (2026). Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 17188-17196. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769
Vancouver
Papasotiropoulos G, Pishbin Z. Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2026;40(20):17188-17196. doi:10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769
BibTeX
@article{Papasotiropoulos2026,
author = {Papasotiropoulos, Georgios and Pishbin, Zein},
title = {Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem},
journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2026},
volume = {40},
number = {20},
pages = {17188--17196},
doi = {10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38769}
}
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