Algorithms for Structured Elections Under Thiele Voting Rules
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 14.03.2026 · 40 (20) · 17084-17092
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38757 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, online erschienen am 14.03.2026. Verfasst von Alexandra Lassota und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the computational complexity of winner determination problems in approval-based committee elections under Thiele voting rules. These form a class of rules parameterized by a fixed weight vector that specifies how a voter's satisfaction depends on the number of approved candidates elected. We first analyze the structure of optimal solutions based on the sets of voters who approve each candidate---that is, how voters' approval ballots induce dependencies between candidates---revealing constraints on a winning committee under any fixed Thiele voting rule. Using this, we design FPT algorithms for Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and other Thiele rules on a natural restricted domain known as the Voter Interval domain---that is, after a suitable ordering of voters, each candidate is approved by a consecutive interval of voters. In particular, we show that every Thiele rule on Voter Interval is FPT with respect to a parameter for which the problem is NP-hard on general instances, even when the parameter takes constant values. Our results advance the understanding of the computational complexity of PAV on Voter Interval instances, which remains one of the central open questions in this area. We further resolve two open questions from the literature on PAV (and other Thiele voting rules) by providing a polynomial-time algorithm for instances where each candidate is approved by at most two voters, and an FPT algorithm parameterized by the total score of a winning committee.
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APA
Lassota, A., & Sornat, K. (2026). Algorithms for Structured Elections Under Thiele Voting Rules. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 40(20), 17084-17092. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38757
Vancouver
Lassota A, Sornat K. Algorithms for Structured Elections Under Thiele Voting Rules. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2026;40(20):17084-17092. doi:10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38757
BibTeX
@article{Lassota2026,
author = {Lassota, Alexandra and Sornat, Krzysztof},
title = {Algorithms for Structured Elections Under Thiele Voting Rules},
journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2026},
volume = {40},
number = {20},
pages = {17084--17092},
doi = {10.1609/aaai.v40i20.38757}
}
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