Factor Price Manipulation, Bureaucratic Corruption, and State Capacity
Journal of Economics and Development Studies · 01.01.2021 · 9 (3)
DOI: 10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Economics and Development Studies, erschienen am 01.01.2021. Verfasst von Tay-Cheng Ma.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article uses ancient Chinese autocracy as a case to investigate the relation between politics and taxation. The result shows that, throughout Chinese history, most of the agricultural surplus of the people has been extracted by political elites through the channels of factor price manipulation and bureaucratic corruption.The key issue is not whether a high tax rate can promote growth, but rather whether the political regime is extractive or not. This provides a solid framework to explain why most developed countries impose significant tax burdens, as they function better than the weaker states in less developed countries. the state taxed lightly. Its annual tax revenue between 1650 and 1850 averaged around four billion liters of rice in real terms. This is to less than 4% of China's hypothetical output in 1800 (Sng, 2014,
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APA
Ma, T. (2021). Factor Price Manipulation, Bureaucratic Corruption, and State Capacity. Journal of Economics and Development Studies, 9(3). https://doi.org/10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1
Vancouver
Ma T. Factor Price Manipulation, Bureaucratic Corruption, and State Capacity. Journal of Economics and Development Studies. 2021;9(3). doi:10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1
BibTeX
@article{Ma2021,
author = {Ma, Tay-Cheng},
title = {Factor Price Manipulation, Bureaucratic Corruption, and State Capacity},
journal = {Journal of Economics and Development Studies},
year = {2021},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
doi = {10.15640/jeds.v9n3a1}
}
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