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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

The Fiscal Politics of Turnover and Tenure: Partisan Competition and Interterm Cycles

Joel W. Johnson

Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy · 02.04.2025 · 6 (1) · 105-134

DOI: 10.1561/113.00000119 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, online erschienen am 02.04.2025. Verfasst von Joel W. Johnson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper argues that fiscal policies vary with governmental turnover and tenure in ways that have been overlooked by prior research. It posits a discrepancy between first-term and nonfirst-term governments: The former consider fiscal adjustments to cultivate partisan reputations, whereas the latter either maintain the status-quo balance or increase deficit spending to buoy their electoral support. The model anticipates first-term heterogeneity, interterm budget cycles, and a last-term effect, in which fiscal deterioration is greater among governments that lose reelection than among those that win another term. An analysis of term-to-term debt trajectories between 1970 and 2019 for twenty-two democracies supports the theory and veto players theory. Fiscal trajectories are most varied among first-term (post-turnover) governments; debt growth is fastest among last-term (pre-turnover) governments; multi-term governments frequently follow a restraint-to-expansion cycle; and all three patterns are more pronounced for majority governments than for coalitions or minority governments.

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APA

Johnson, J. W. (2025). The Fiscal Politics of Turnover and Tenure: Partisan Competition and Interterm Cycles. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, 6(1), 105-134. https://doi.org/10.1561/113.00000119

Vancouver

Johnson JW. The Fiscal Politics of Turnover and Tenure: Partisan Competition and Interterm Cycles. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy. 2025;6(1):105-134. doi:10.1561/113.00000119

BibTeX
@article{Johnson2025,
  author = {Johnson, Joel W.},
  title = {The Fiscal Politics of Turnover and Tenure: Partisan Competition and Interterm Cycles},
  journal = {Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {105--134},
  doi = {10.1561/113.00000119}
}
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