Polarization and Group Cooperation
Quarterly Journal of Political Science · 11.04.2023 · 18 (2) · 215-241
DOI: 10.1561/100.00021036 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quarterly Journal of Political Science, online erschienen am 11.04.2023. Verfasst von Andrea Robbett und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 36 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does increased partisanship undermine the ability of politically heterogeneous groups to function and cooperate in apolitical settings? On the eve of the 2020 U.S. elections, we conducted an online experiment in which Democrats and Republicans played repeated public goods games, both with and without punishment. Absent punishment, mixed-party groups are less cooperative and efficient than homogeneous groups. However, polarized groups fare no worse than those in which political affiliations are unknown. We find no differences in cooperation across groups that are able to punish free-riding behavior. Thus, knowing that one is in a group with like-minded individuals can serve as a substitute for an enforcement mechanism, but polarized groups can, at some efficiency cost, achieve similar contributions when sanctions are possible.
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APA
Robbett, A., & Matthews, P. H. (2023). Polarization and Group Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 18(2), 215-241. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00021036
Vancouver
Robbett A, Matthews PH. Polarization and Group Cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 2023;18(2):215-241. doi:10.1561/100.00021036
BibTeX
@article{Robbett2023,
author = {Robbett, Andrea and Matthews, Peter Hans},
title = {Polarization and Group Cooperation},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {215--241},
doi = {10.1561/100.00021036}
}
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