Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy · 01.02.2016 · 4 (2)
DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v4i2.2428 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.02.2016. Verfasst von Uriah Kriegel. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano's mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject's act, its object, and a 'content,' but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more defensible than might initially appear.
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APA
Kriegel, U. (2016). Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(2). https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v4i2.2428
Vancouver
Kriegel U. Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. 2016;4(2). doi:10.15173/jhap.v4i2.2428
BibTeX
@article{Kriegel2016,
author = {Kriegel, Uriah},
title = {Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality},
journal = {Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy},
year = {2016},
volume = {4},
number = {2},
doi = {10.15173/jhap.v4i2.2428}
}
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