Quine’s Problem
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy · 2024
DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v12i4.5475 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2024. Verfasst von Nigel Hems. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper offers a defence of sense-datum statements from A.J. Ayer’s perspective that represents a response to Quine’s naturalistic ontology. Starting with Quine’s “On What There Is” (1948), and the following “Symposium” of 1951, I argue that Ayer’s proposed method of establishing sense-datum statements in his “Symposium” piece, which challenges Quine’s ontology of physical objects, is not a viable alternative to Quine’s scientific naturalism. I argue that by taking a broadly intensional approach, Ayer can offer a response to Quine’s position. More specifically, I contend that it is possible to form a distinctly non-scientific, epistemological account of sense-data by employing primitive “sensory predicates” within basic propositions. In terms of ontology, a technical ruling for “existence”, working alongside appropriate “meaning-rules”, legislates for basic sense-datum statements, thus distancing them from the regimented, extensionalised, stimulus meaning strategy indicative of Quine’s naturalistic ontology.
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APA
Hems, N. (2024). Quine’s Problem. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v12i4.5475
Vancouver
Hems N. Quine’s Problem. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. 2024. doi:10.15173/jhap.v12i4.5475
BibTeX
@article{Hems2024,
author = {Hems, Nigel},
title = {Quine’s Problem},
journal = {Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.15173/jhap.v12i4.5475}
}
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