Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy · 2024
DOI: 10.15173/jhap.v12i3.5476 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 2024. Verfasst von Colin Johnston. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Frege maintains that there are not two distinct acts, assertion and denial; rather, denying p is one and the same as asserting not-p. Wittgenstein appears not to recognise this identity in Frege, attributing to him the contrary view that a proposition may have one of two verbs, "is true" or "is false". This paper explains Wittgenstein’s attribution as a consequence of Frege’s treatment of content as theoretically prior to the act of judgment. Where content is prior to judgment, the denial of p—what is rejected in asserting p—is distinct from the assertion of not-p. Wittgenstein’s own embrace of Frege’s identity is then considered, an embrace explained in part by his repudiation of Frege’s theoretical order.
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APA
Johnston, C. (2024). Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v12i3.5476
Vancouver
Johnston C. Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. 2024. doi:10.15173/jhap.v12i3.5476
BibTeX
@article{Johnston2024,
author = {Johnston, Colin},
title = {Wittgenstein and Frege on Negation and Denial},
journal = {Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.15173/jhap.v12i3.5476}
}
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