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Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders

Maribel Sáez, María Gutiérrez

Theoretical Inquiries in Law · 01.01.2015 · 16 (1) · 107-130

DOI: 10.1515/til-2015-006 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Inquiries in Law, online erschienen am 03.02.2015. Verfasst von Maribel Sáez und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This Article investigates the determinants of dividend policy in firms with concentrated ownership structures. A review of the empirical literature shows that dividend payout ratios are lower in firms with controlling shareholders. We explain this finding as a consequence of the legal rules governing cash distributions, which leave the dividend decision in the hands of the firm insiders, and the lack of monitoring mechanisms for checking the power of controlling shareholders. The analysis of the empirical evidence on dividend policy points to the existence of an unresolved agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors. We conclude that controlling shareholders are currently using the dividend policy to expropriate minority shareholders.

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APA

Sáez, M., & Gutiérrez, M. (2015). Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders. Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 16(1), 107-130. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2015-006

Vancouver

Sáez M, Gutiérrez M. Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders. Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 2015;16(1):107-130. doi:10.1515/til-2015-006

BibTeX
@article{Sez2015,
  author = {Sáez, Maribel and Gutiérrez, María},
  title = {Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders},
  journal = {Theoretical Inquiries in Law},
  year = {2015},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {107--130},
  doi = {10.1515/til-2015-006}
}
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