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A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices

Papatya Duman, Claus-Jochen Haake

Review of Economics · 25.11.2025 · 76 (3) · 241-270

DOI: 10.1515/roe-2024-0048 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Economics, online erschienen am 09.03.2026. Verfasst von Papatya Duman und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 6 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We investigate whether the recently approved reforms of the apportionment of parliamentary seats to parties in the German Bundestag affects the parties’ political influence measured by power indices. We find that under neither reform the underlying simple game, which describes the possibilities to form governments, remains unchanged and as a result the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are unaltered. As a consequence, the major change resulting from the reforms is the reduction of the Bundestag’s size to 630 seats.

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APA

Duman, P., & Haake, C. (2025). A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. Review of Economics, 76(3), 241-270. https://doi.org/10.1515/roe-2024-0048

Vancouver

Duman P, Haake C. A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices. Review of Economics. 2025;76(3):241-270. doi:10.1515/roe-2024-0048

BibTeX
@article{Duman2025,
  author = {Duman, Papatya and Haake, Claus-Jochen},
  title = {A Note on the Size Reduction Reform in the German Parliament: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Power Indices},
  journal = {Review of Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {76},
  number = {3},
  pages = {241--270},
  doi = {10.1515/roe-2024-0048}
}
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