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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 3.0

Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Leo Townsend

Journal of Social Ontology · 2015

DOI: 10.1515/jso-2014-0040 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Social Ontology, 2015. Verfasst von Leo Townsend. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 8 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This dense, difficult new book sees Raimo Tuomela expand his pioneering ‘wemode approach’ to the philosophy of sociality. At its heart is Tuomela’s feted distinction between two ways of operating as an intentional subject: there is the I-mode, in which one thinks and acts ‘as a private person’ (2), and the we-mode, in which one thinks and acts ‘as a member of a group’ (2). Here, as in previous work, Tuomela seeks to delineate and support the distinction, and draw out its implications for various facets of the social world. The book contains a healthy mix of consolidation and extension of Tuomela’s views, and so will prove rewarding both for those familiar with his previous work and those not. The opening chapter presents an instructive basic description of the I-mode/we-mode distinction, which gets fleshed out via detailed technical analyses in the two succeeding chapters. Apart from their discussion of group agency these first three chapters do not mark any significant change of mind, focus or direction from Tuomela’s previous work, and the same can be said of Chapter 5, which recapitulates Tuomela’s ‘bulletin board view’ of group attitude formation (cf. Tuomela 2007). By contrast, the discussion of collective reasoning in Chapters 4 and 7 provides crucial new insight into this core mechanism of we-mode activity. Also new and important is Tuomela’s effort (in Chapters 6 and 8) to accommodate ‘non-autonomous’ groups within the we-mode framework, by relaxing paradigmatic we-mode requirements such as voluntary entrance/ exit and collective acceptance of a group ethos. Chapter 9, on solidarity, elucidates the ‘togetherness’ (or ‘we-ness’) that prevails in those groups which are paradigmatically we-mode. Tuomela claims that the book’s ‘new insights and improvements have to do with a stronger emphasis on group agency and group reasoning’ (14). As I read

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APA

Townsend, L. (2015). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Journal of Social Ontology. https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2014-0040

Vancouver

Townsend L. Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Journal of Social Ontology. 2015. doi:10.1515/jso-2014-0040

BibTeX
@article{Townsend2015,
  author = {Townsend, Leo},
  title = {Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents},
  journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1515/jso-2014-0040}
}
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