Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations
Journal of Social Ontology · 2016
DOI: 10.1515/jso-2014-0027 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Social Ontology, 2016. Verfasst von Jan Almäng. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Barry Smith has recently argued against John Searle’s thesis that institutional facts exist because they are represented as existing in a certain community. Smith argues that institutional facts can exist even though they are not represented as existing and that institutional facts can fail to obtain even though they are represented as obtaining. In this paper it is argued that Smith’s challenge can be met for a certain class of legal facts. I argue that in order to solve the problem posed by Smith, we must distinguish between three different kinds of institutional facts and between three different kinds of representation which sustain their existence.
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APA
Almäng, J. (2016). Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations. Journal of Social Ontology. https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2014-0027
Vancouver
Almäng J. Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations. Journal of Social Ontology. 2016. doi:10.1515/jso-2014-0027
BibTeX
@article{Almng2016,
author = {Almäng, Jan},
title = {Legal Facts and Dependence on Representations},
journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
year = {2016},
doi = {10.1515/jso-2014-0027}
}
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