Tax-Haven Investments and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China
China Finance and Economic Review · 05.03.2026 · 15 (1) · 82-103
DOI: 10.1515/cfer-2026-0004 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift China Finance and Economic Review, online erschienen am 05.03.2026. Verfasst von Zhihua Wei und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We investigated the effect of direct investments in tax havens on firms’ auditor choices and found that because tax-haven investments intensify agency problems and information asymmetry, firms tend to hire high-quality auditors to address these issues, with this tendency being stronger in firms with weak internal-governance mechanisms or poor information environments. The economic consequences analysis revealed that while selecting high-quality auditors for tax-haven investments increases the likelihood of a nonstandard audit opinion, it significantly decreases the probability of regulatory violations and enhances firm value. Our study provides empirical evidence for firms’ auditor-choice behavior in the context of overseas investments.
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APA
Wei, Z., Kang, W., Huang, X., & Li, B. (2026). Tax-Haven Investments and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China. China Finance and Economic Review, 15(1), 82-103. https://doi.org/10.1515/cfer-2026-0004
Vancouver
Wei Z, Kang W, Huang X, Li B. Tax-Haven Investments and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China. China Finance and Economic Review. 2026;15(1):82-103. doi:10.1515/cfer-2026-0004
BibTeX
@article{Wei2026,
author = {Wei, Zhihua and Kang, Wei and Huang, Xiaoyun and Li, Bo},
title = {Tax-Haven Investments and Auditor Choice: Evidence from China},
journal = {China Finance and Economic Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {1},
pages = {82--103},
doi = {10.1515/cfer-2026-0004}
}
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