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Tipping as a Pricing Signal

Kwok Ping Tsang

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 02.11.2026 · 26 (2) · 243-259

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0137 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 28.05.2026. Verfasst von Kwok Ping Tsang. Die Arbeit nennt 10 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper proposes a menu-cost theory of tipping. When firms face costs of changing posted prices, voluntary tips provide a noisy but informative signal of whether current prices are “too low” or “too high.” The firm adjusts its price only when tip deviations exceed an information-dependent threshold, generating a time-varying inaction band. The framework explains why tipping is common in volatile, service-intensive industries but rare in standardized chains with rich alternative telemetry. Unlike existing models based on norms or reciprocity, this approach requires only that average tips increase weakly with perceived surplus for the consumers.

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APA

Tsang, K. P. (2026). Tipping as a Pricing Signal. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(2), 243-259. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0137

Vancouver

Tsang KP. Tipping as a Pricing Signal. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(2):243-259. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0137

BibTeX
@article{Tsang2026,
  author = {Tsang, Kwok Ping},
  title = {Tipping as a Pricing Signal},
  journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {2},
  pages = {243--259},
  doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0137}
}
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