Tipping as a Pricing Signal
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 02.11.2026 · 26 (2) · 243-259
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0137 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 28.05.2026. Verfasst von Kwok Ping Tsang. Die Arbeit nennt 10 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper proposes a menu-cost theory of tipping. When firms face costs of changing posted prices, voluntary tips provide a noisy but informative signal of whether current prices are “too low” or “too high.” The firm adjusts its price only when tip deviations exceed an information-dependent threshold, generating a time-varying inaction band. The framework explains why tipping is common in volatile, service-intensive industries but rare in standardized chains with rich alternative telemetry. Unlike existing models based on norms or reciprocity, this approach requires only that average tips increase weakly with perceived surplus for the consumers.
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APA
Tsang, K. P. (2026). Tipping as a Pricing Signal. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(2), 243-259. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0137
Vancouver
Tsang KP. Tipping as a Pricing Signal. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(2):243-259. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0137
BibTeX
@article{Tsang2026,
author = {Tsang, Kwok Ping},
title = {Tipping as a Pricing Signal},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {243--259},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0137}
}
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