Coordinated Punishment? Only if Reciprocators Abound
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 02.11.2026 · 26 (2) · 261-299
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0119 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 28.05.2026. Verfasst von Adriana Alventosa und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Spanish Ministry of Economics, Innovation and Competitiveness, Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Consellería de Educación, Universidades y Empleo.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we explore under which conditions coordinated punishment performs better than uncoordinated punishment in a team trust game with information asymmetries. We theoretically compare: (i) an uncoordinated punishment system where individual punishment is effective, and (ii) a coordinated punishment system where a minimum number of individuals carrying out punishment is needed for punishment to be effective. Our results reveal that only when there is a sufficiently high proportion of reciprocal investors in the population, a coordinated punishment system leads to efficient equilibria in a wider range of cases than uncoordinated punishment and it does so with higher returns and higher levels of social welfare.
Förderung
- Spanish Ministry of Economics, Innovation and Competitiveness
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
- Consellería de Educación, Universidades y Empleo
Zitieren
APA
Alventosa, A., Calabuig, V., & Olcina, G. (2026). Coordinated Punishment? Only if Reciprocators Abound. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(2), 261-299. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0119
Vancouver
Alventosa A, Calabuig V, Olcina G. Coordinated Punishment? Only if Reciprocators Abound. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(2):261-299. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0119
BibTeX
@article{Alventosa2026,
author = {Alventosa, Adriana and Calabuig, Vicente and Olcina, Gonzalo},
title = {Coordinated Punishment? Only if Reciprocators Abound},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {261--299},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0119}
}
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