Common Ownership and Endogenous Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Oligopoly
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 02.11.2026 · 26 (2) · 301-333
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0091 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 28.05.2026. Verfasst von Sumi Cho und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study considers common ownership among public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly market and examines an endogenous choice game of managerial delegation contracts. We find two asymmetric delegation equilibria: (i) when common ownership is low, the public firm does not delegate while the two private firms do; and (ii) when common ownership is high, the public firm delegates while only one private firm delegates. We also identify a symmetric delegation equilibrium where (iii) all firms delegate in intermediate cases. We demonstrate that when common ownership is high enough, an asymmetric delegation equilibrium may solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem between the private firms, leading to a reduction in social welfare. We further discuss policy implications for public firm management, such as privatization policies, welfare-oriented delegation contracts, and non-public offerings in the stock market.
Förderung
- Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea
Zitieren
APA
Cho, S., & Lee, S. (2026). Common Ownership and Endogenous Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Oligopoly. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(2), 301-333. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0091
Vancouver
Cho S, Lee S. Common Ownership and Endogenous Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Oligopoly. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(2):301-333. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0091
BibTeX
@article{Cho2026,
author = {Cho, Sumi and Lee, Sang-Ho},
title = {Common Ownership and Endogenous Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Oligopoly},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {301--333},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0091}
}
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