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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Delegated Contracting, Wage Compression, and Quiet Quitting

Robertas Zubrickas

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 27.05.2026 · 26 (1) · 177-202

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0117 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 07.04.2026. Verfasst von Robertas Zubrickas. Die Arbeit nennt 66 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We argue that delegated contracting and transfer pricing can form a set of conditions leading to coarse pay incentives. The allocation mechanism of negotiated transfer pricing creates asymmetry in the intrafirm valuation of employee effort. For a divisional manager, the value of effort is determined by the transfer price but for the center by the contribution to firm profits with the transfer price coming as a cost. Divisional managers’ incentives become misaligned with firm profit maximization, which has implications for employees’ compensation. We demonstrate the optimality of payroll cost controls imposed on divisional managers despite that managers respond by compressing employees’ wages and that employees respond by quiet quitting. We also consider an extension of the model where negotiated transfer pricing can create more distortion in larger firms. Differences in managerial incentives across small and large firms produce the firm-size wage effects: a higher average wage but less wage variation in larger firms.

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APA

Zubrickas, R. (2026). Delegated Contracting, Wage Compression, and Quiet Quitting. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(1), 177-202. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0117

Vancouver

Zubrickas R. Delegated Contracting, Wage Compression, and Quiet Quitting. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(1):177-202. doi:10.1515/bejte-2024-0117

BibTeX
@article{Zubrickas2026,
  author = {Zubrickas, Robertas},
  title = {Delegated Contracting, Wage Compression, and Quiet Quitting},
  journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {26},
  number = {1},
  pages = {177--202},
  doi = {10.1515/bejte-2024-0117}
}
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