Games with Unawareness
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 29.06.2021 · 21 (2) · 433-488
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0186 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 15.09.2020. Verfasst von Yossi Feinberg. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players’ perceptions are limited, as well as situations where players realize that other players’ perceptions may be limited and so on. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information, and extensive form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players’ perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler’s description of perceptions, the players’ description of other players’ perceptions, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior.
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APA
Feinberg, Y. (2021). Games with Unawareness. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 21(2), 433-488. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0186
Vancouver
Feinberg Y. Games with Unawareness. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2021;21(2):433-488. doi:10.1515/bejte-2018-0186
BibTeX
@article{Feinberg2021,
author = {Feinberg, Yossi},
title = {Games with Unawareness},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2021},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {433--488},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2018-0186}
}
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