Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 26.07.2018 · 18 (2)
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0169 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, erschienen am 26.07.2018. Verfasst von Anja Rey und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 108 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Inspired by the study of control scenarios in elections and complementing manipulation and bribery settings in cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce the notion of structural control in weighted voting games. We model two types of influence, adding players to and deleting players from a game, with goals such as increasing a given player’s Shapley–Shubik or probabilistic Penrose–Banzhaf index in relation to the original game. We study the computational complexity of the problems of whether such structural changes can achieve the desired effect.
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APA
Rey, A., & Rothe, J. (2018). Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 18(2). https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0169
Vancouver
Rey A, Rothe J. Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2018;18(2). doi:10.1515/bejte-2016-0169
BibTeX
@article{Rey2018,
author = {Rey, Anja and Rothe, Jörg},
title = {Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2018},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2016-0169}
}
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