Moral Expertise
Analyse & Kritik · 01.11.2012 · 34 (2) · 217-230
DOI: 10.1515/auk-2012-0204 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analyse & Kritik, online erschienen am 11.02.2016. Verfasst von Karen Jones und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 19-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 4 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than they are because of their focus on moral expertise regarding all-in judgments about rightness. We reject this emphasis on all-in judgment in favor of an account of moral expertise as typically multi-stranded and domain limited. This account of moral expertise is better able to address the problem of how to identify those who have expertise. It also offers a more nuanced picture of the contrast between accepting a moral claim on one's own and accepting it on testimony.
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APA
Jones, K., & Schroeter, F. (2012). Moral Expertise. Analyse & Kritik, 34(2), 217-230. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2012-0204
Vancouver
Jones K, Schroeter F. Moral Expertise. Analyse & Kritik. 2012;34(2):217-230. doi:10.1515/auk-2012-0204
BibTeX
@article{Jones2012,
author = {Jones, Karen and Schroeter, François},
title = {Moral Expertise},
journal = {Analyse & Kritik},
year = {2012},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
pages = {217--230},
doi = {10.1515/auk-2012-0204}
}
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