Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities
Asian Journal of Law and Economics · 2014
DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2013-0002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2014. Verfasst von Yuki Amemiya und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We construct a model of market-share contracts with vertical externalities. When a dominant supplier offers a linear wholesale price to a retailer, vertical externalities, well-recognized as double-marginalization problems, arise in the vertical relation. The dominant supplier facing vertical externalities charges a wholesale price that is excessively high for both the vertical relation and social welfare. Under market-share contracts, the retailer can commit to increase the sales of goods produced by the dominant supplier for a lower wholesale price. We point out that this induces the vertical relation to engage in market-share contracts even in the absence of exclusionary effects in the upstream market. We also show that such contracts mitigate vertical externalities and improve social welfare.
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APA
Amemiya, Y., Kitamura, H., & Oshiro, J. (2014). Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2013-0002
Vancouver
Amemiya Y, Kitamura H, Oshiro J. Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. 2014. doi:10.1515/ajle-2013-0002
BibTeX
@article{Amemiya2014,
author = {Amemiya, Yuki and Kitamura, Hiroshi and Oshiro, Jun},
title = {Market-Share Contracts with Vertical Externalities},
journal = {Asian Journal of Law and Economics},
year = {2014},
doi = {10.1515/ajle-2013-0002}
}
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