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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory?

Aaron Wells

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie · 04.03.2026

DOI: 10.1515/agph-2025-0148 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, online erschienen am 04.03.2026. Verfasst von Aaron Wells. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

There is a relatively overlooked problem with Kant’s claim that in inquiry we must treat nature as if it were actually infinite in extent: he also states that the concept of an actually infinite world is self-contradictory. This threatens to make the command to treat the world as infinite incoherent; the problem also affects his error theory for traditional metaphysics and his account of the sublime. After laying out this worry in greater detail than has been done so far, I consider and reject readings on which Kant either does not consider this case a violation of ought-implies-can or allows that in this case, following an incoherent demand is epistemically acceptable on consequentialist grounds. Then I turn to my preferred solution, which takes the relevant regulative principle to concern Kant’s noumena (understood as intensionally distinct from things in themselves), whereas the contradiction is provoked only by representations of phenomena.

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APA

Wells, A. (2026). Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory?. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2025-0148

Vancouver

Wells A. Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory?. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 2026. doi:10.1515/agph-2025-0148

BibTeX
@article{Wells2026,
  author = {Wells, Aaron},
  title = {Is Kant’s Concept World Self-Contradictory?},
  journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1515/agph-2025-0148}
}
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