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Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure

Keisuke Nakao, Masatoshi Tsumagari

Asian Journal of Law and Economics · 2012

DOI: 10.1515/2154-4611.1071 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2012. Verfasst von Keisuke Nakao und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Using a game-theoretic model of criminal procedure, we investigate relative merits and demerits of discretionary and mandatory prosecution. The game illustrates a prosecutor's dilemma associated with his two tasks: evidence production and case screening. Discretionary prosecution makes use of incriminating evidence to dispose of weak cases, but discretionary prosecution may suffer the moral-hazard problem in evidence production more seriously than mandatory prosecution. Our welfare analyses suggest that mandatory prosecution outperforms discretionary prosecution when evidence transmission from the prosecutor to the judge is accurate and/or when the cost of litigation incurred by the prosecutor is large.

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APA

Nakao, K., & Tsumagari, M. (2012). Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-4611.1071

Vancouver

Nakao K, Tsumagari M. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. 2012. doi:10.1515/2154-4611.1071

BibTeX
@article{Nakao2012,
  author = {Nakao, Keisuke and Tsumagari, Masatoshi},
  title = {Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure},
  journal = {Asian Journal of Law and Economics},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1515/2154-4611.1071}
}
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