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Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents

Robert McGuire

Asian Journal of Law and Economics · 2012

DOI: 10.1515/2154-4611.1062 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2012. Verfasst von Robert McGuire. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Ten years after the Japanese Supreme Court established a duty of care for employers to guard employee health, incidents of death by overwork remain critically high. This Note argues that the Dentsū standard of near-strict employer liability does not create sufficient incentives to prevent karoshi. Applying Steven Shavell’s insight that a victim who knows his injurer will be liable for damages will not be incentivized by the law to prevent the harm, the Note explains why neither employees nor the employers responded to Dentsū. It concludes that Dentsū is correctly understood as cause of action in tort for survivors of karoshi victims, not a vehicle to change the Japanese workplace.

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APA

McGuire, R. (2012). Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-4611.1062

Vancouver

McGuire R. Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. 2012. doi:10.1515/2154-4611.1062

BibTeX
@article{McGuire2012,
  author = {McGuire, Robert},
  title = {Dentsū Changed Nothing: Reexamining Karoshi in Japan Through Shavell's Insights on the Incentives to Prevent Accidents},
  journal = {Asian Journal of Law and Economics},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1515/2154-4611.1062}
}
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