A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan
Asian Journal of Law and Economics · 2012
DOI: 10.1515/2154-4611.1050 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2012. Verfasst von Eric Ip. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The consensus over independent constitutional judicial review – that it inevitably stems from electoral and inter-branch competition – has been weakened by recent empirical discoveries; however, empiricists have yet to offer a coherent explanation why non-competitive, authoritarian, governments would tolerate constitutional courts that strike down their legislation. This article proposes a “Constitutional Investment Theory” that solves this puzzle: expressive symbolism is central to these regimes’ calculus for acquiescing in the activation of judicial review; the variable perdurability of judicial review depends on how much trust the regime invest in the judiciary; and activism in judicial review is the likelier to emerge the higher the transaction costs of retaliating against offending courts. Evidence from Singapore and pre-2000 Taiwan lends support to this theory.
Zitieren
APA
Ip, E. (2012). A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-4611.1050
Vancouver
Ip E. A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan. Asian Journal of Law and Economics. 2012. doi:10.1515/2154-4611.1050
BibTeX
@article{Ip2012,
author = {Ip, Eric},
title = {A Positive Theory of Constitutional Judicial Review: Evidence from Singapore and Taiwan},
journal = {Asian Journal of Law and Economics},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.1515/2154-4611.1050}
}
EUVIMED