Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 2012
DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1789 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012. Verfasst von Duygu Yengin. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry, mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deficit and welfare lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class.
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APA
Yengin, D. (2012). Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1789
Vancouver
Yengin D. Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2012. doi:10.1515/1935-1704.1789
BibTeX
@article{Yengin2012,
author = {Yengin, Duygu},
title = {Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.1515/1935-1704.1789}
}
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