The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 2012
DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1738 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012. Verfasst von Ayala Arad. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 18-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper introduces a new allocation game, related to Blotto games: each tennis coach assigns his four different skilled players to four positions, and then each team plays all other teams in the tournament. The winning team is the one with the highest total score.The set of equilibria is characterized and experimental behavior in variants of the game is analyzed in light of an adapted level-k model which is based on an appealing specification of the starting point (Level-0). The results exhibit a systematic pattern- a majority of the subjects used a small number of strategies. However, although level-k thinking is naturally specified in this context, only a limited use of (low) level-k thinking was found. These findings differ from those obtained in previous studies, which found high frequencies of level-k reasoning among subjects in various games. Thus, the results illuminate some bounds of the level-k approach.
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APA
Arad, A. (2012). The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1738
Vancouver
Arad A. The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2012. doi:10.1515/1935-1704.1738
BibTeX
@article{Arad2012,
author = {Arad, Ayala},
title = {The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2012},
doi = {10.1515/1935-1704.1738}
}
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