Crossref
Transparency, scepticism, and inflation: a noisy observation game of monetary policy
J. for Global Business Advancement · 2025 · 17 (6) · 645-665
DOI: 10.1504/jgba.2025.154100 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift J. for Global Business Advancement, 2025. Verfasst von Jimmy Teng.
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APA
Teng, J. (2025). Transparency, scepticism, and inflation: a noisy observation game of monetary policy. J. for Global Business Advancement, 17(6), 645-665. https://doi.org/10.1504/jgba.2025.154100
Vancouver
Teng J. Transparency, scepticism, and inflation: a noisy observation game of monetary policy. J. for Global Business Advancement. 2025;17(6):645-665. doi:10.1504/jgba.2025.154100
BibTeX
@article{Teng2025,
author = {Teng, Jimmy},
title = {Transparency, scepticism, and inflation: a noisy observation game of monetary policy},
journal = {J. for Global Business Advancement},
year = {2025},
volume = {17},
number = {6},
pages = {645--665},
doi = {10.1504/jgba.2025.154100}
}
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