The Form of Soul in the Phaedo
PLATO JOURNAL · 2011
DOI: 10.14195/2183-4105_11_3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLATO JOURNAL, 2011. Verfasst von Brian D. Prince. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Phaedo’s two most prominent philosophical topics are the theory of Forms and the immortality of souls.1 So the intersection of these should also be of central importance, and in particular, the question whether there is a Form of Soul in which individual souls participate. This question is salient for two reasons: first, souls receive specially focused attention in Plato’s texts, and second, if the fact that a thing is a soul were not to be explained by participation in a Form, this would make souls highly unusual among the non-Form items in Plato’s universe.2 That is, the Form of Soul occupies — or fails to occupy — a special slot in the metaphysics of the Phaedo: either it exists, and therefore souls have the same metaphysical explanation as visible items, or the Form of Soul does not exist, and therefore there is some quite different explanation of why something is a soul.
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APA
Prince, B. D. (2011). The Form of Soul in the Phaedo. PLATO JOURNAL. https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_11_3
Vancouver
Prince BD. The Form of Soul in the Phaedo. PLATO JOURNAL. 2011. doi:10.14195/2183-4105_11_3
BibTeX
@article{Prince2011,
author = {Prince, Brian D.},
title = {The Form of Soul in the Phaedo},
journal = {PLATO JOURNAL},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.14195/2183-4105_11_3}
}
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