Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic
Revista Filosófica de Coimbra · 2020
DOI: 10.14195/0872-0851_58_5 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revista Filosófica de Coimbra, 2020. Verfasst von John Bolender. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
After Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein realized that elementary propositions may logically conflict with each other, due to the fact that the most elementary measurements may contradict each other. This led to the view that logic consists of various calculi. A calculus consists of measurement scales, each scale being a rule for the application of numbers. These scales determine logical relationships between elementary propositions by reason of arithmetical relations. Attempts to reject Wittgenstein's change in viewpoint, which ignore the relevance of measurement and arithmetic, are remiss. In this light, I discuss Sarah Moss’s criticism of intermediate Wittgenstein.
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APA
Bolender, J. (2020). Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra. https://doi.org/10.14195/0872-0851_58_5
Vancouver
Bolender J. Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra. 2020. doi:10.14195/0872-0851_58_5
BibTeX
@article{Bolender2020,
author = {Bolender, John},
title = {Color incompatibility in Wittgenstein and its relationship with Arithmetic},
journal = {Revista Filosófica de Coimbra},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.14195/0872-0851_58_5}
}
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