The opacity of knowledge
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science · 05.11.2026 · 41 (3) · 434-444
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.28294 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Murali Ramachandran. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An epistemic externalist should allow that whatever proposition about the world, P, one knows to be true, there will be some other fact one is not in a position to know, but which is required for the belief in P to count as knowledge. We contend that ordinary knowers are cognizant of such ‘unknown knowledge-makers’. On this basis, we present anovel case—we distinguish it from rivals—for widespread KK-failure: quite generally, if one knows P, one will not be in a position to know that one knows it.
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APA
Ramachandran, M. (2026). The opacity of knowledge. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 41(3), 434-444. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.28294
Vancouver
Ramachandran M. The opacity of knowledge. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. 2026;41(3):434-444. doi:10.1387/theoria.28294
BibTeX
@article{Ramachandran2026,
author = {Ramachandran, Murali},
title = {The opacity of knowledge},
journal = {THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {41},
number = {3},
pages = {434--444},
doi = {10.1387/theoria.28294}
}
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