A case of entity realists using abductive confirmation
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science · 05.11.2026 · 41 (3) · 445-460
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.27988 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Kenneth Aizawa. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper has three objectives. First, it argues that Hodgkin, Huxley, and Katz were entity realists who confirmed the existence of specific entities by abduction. Second, it outlines a theory of this abductive reasoning. Third, it shows how the case is a counterexample to Hacking’s contention that experimentalists do not accept abductive evidence. The paper is not a “mere counterexample” paper, as it outlines a positive account of how to understand Hodgkin, Huxley, and Katz’s abductive reasoning and their entity realism. This single case invites the question of how many more such cases are to be found.
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APA
Aizawa, K. (2026). A case of entity realists using abductive confirmation. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 41(3), 445-460. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.27988
Vancouver
Aizawa K. A case of entity realists using abductive confirmation. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. 2026;41(3):445-460. doi:10.1387/theoria.27988
BibTeX
@article{Aizawa2026,
author = {Aizawa, Kenneth},
title = {A case of entity realists using abductive confirmation},
journal = {THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {41},
number = {3},
pages = {445--460},
doi = {10.1387/theoria.27988}
}
EUVIMED