Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science · 2015
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.11008 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2015. Verfasst von Jon Altschul.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain. Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism. Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.
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APA
Altschul, J. (2015). Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.11008
Vancouver
Altschul J. Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science. 2015. doi:10.1387/theoria.11008
BibTeX
@article{Altschul2015,
author = {Altschul, Jon},
title = {Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem},
journal = {THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.1387/theoria.11008}
}
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