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StudienprotokollOpen Access · CC BY 4.0

Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol

Chia-Wei Tsai, Yao-Chung Chang, Andy Su, I-Chun Chen, Ying-Hsun Lai iD

PLOS One · 2026

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0357035 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2026. Verfasst von Chia-Wei Tsai und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taichung, Taiwan. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Computer Security, Quantum Theory, Models, Theoretical, Communication. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Science and Technology Council, Ocean Affairs Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A recent protocol by Cai et al. [ J. Korean Phys. Soc. (2026)] proposed a controller-independent controlled bidirectional quantum secure direct communication (CICBQSDC) scheme based on four-particle cluster states, claiming provable unconditional security via Wyner’s wiretap channel theory. In this paper, we demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to a quantum Trojan-horse attack that is entirely consistent with the threat model assumed by the original authors; namely, the controller Charlie is an untrusted party with the same capabilities as the strongest possible eavesdropper. Specifically, this paper shows that Charlie uses Trojan-horse probes to steal k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , and k 3 independently, and then he combines the measurement results and initial states of the four-particle cluster states to completely recover all four secret message bits encoded by Alice and Bob. Crucially, this attack introduces no disturbance to the legitimate qubits and therefore produces no increase in the ZX or XZ error rates, rendering it undetectable by the protocol’s security-check mechanism. This paper concludes that the unconditional security claim of Cai et al. fails to hold because it relies on a critical blind spot: a fundamental contradiction between modeling the controller as a maximally powerful eavesdropper and implicitly restricting their capabilities to a side-channel-free, ideal single-photon framework. This result highlights the general inadequacy of wiretap-channel-based security proof in the absence of rigorous physical-layer constraints, underscoring the critical need for implementation security in future QSDC designs.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Computer SecurityQuantum TheoryModels, TheoreticalCommunicationAlgorithmsQuantum Mechanics

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taichung University of Science and Technology, Taichung, Taiwan.
  • Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taitung University, Taitung, Taiwan.
  • Department of Industrial and Business Management, Open University of Kaohsiung, Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

ORCID-Profile: Ying-Hsun Lai

Förderung

  • National Science and Technology Council
  • Ocean Affairs Council

Zitieren

APA

Tsai, C. W., Chang, Y. C., Su, A., Chen, I. C., & Lai, Y. H. (2026). Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0357035

Vancouver

Tsai CW, Chang YC, Su A, Chen IC, Lai YH. Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol. PLOS One. 2026. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0357035

BibTeX
@article{Tsai2026,
  author = {Tsai, Chia-Wei and Chang, Yao-Chung and Su, Andy and Chen, I-Chun and Lai, Ying-Hsun},
  title = {Cryptanalysis of a controller-independent controlled bidirectional QSDC protocol},
  journal = {PLOS One},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0357035}
}
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