Design, comparison and selection of two competition incentive mechanisms
PLOS One · 01.04.2026 · 21 (4) · e0345083
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0345083 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, online erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Dahai Li und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Big Data and Statistics, Anhui University, Hefei, Anhui Province, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Motivation, Competitive Behavior. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, Scientific Research Foundation of Education Department of Anhui Province of China, Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
When facing multiple agent teams, principals often implement competitive mechanisms to mitigate moral hazard. These mechanisms can be categorized as either result-oriented or process-oriented, depending on their operational focus. This paper analyzes the optimal incentive contracts offered by principals to agents under these two competitive modes. Furthermore, to mitigate potential conflicts arising from these mechanisms, the matching of agents with varying abilities is also considered. Our analysis reveals that both competitive modes can effectively incentivize agent effort. However, excessive result-oriented competition can be detrimental to the principal’s benefits, suggesting that its intensity should be carefully calibrated. Moreover, when forming agent pairs, a “strong-weak” pairing is preferable to a “strong-strong” pairing, which, in turn, is preferable to a “weak-weak” pairing. Finally, this paper discusses the scope of application for each competition-incentive system. These findings provide a foundation for effectively utilizing competitive mechanisms to enhance the principal’s returns.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Big Data and Statistics, Anhui University, Hefei, Anhui Province, China.
- School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei, Anhui Province, China.
- School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China.
- Wu Jinglian School of Economics, Changzhou University, Changzhou, Jiangsu Province, China.
- Hengyang Normal University, Facuity of Economics and Management, Hengyang, Hunan Province, China.
ORCID-Profile: Dahai Li
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Scientific Research Foundation of Education Department of Anhui Province of China
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Zitieren
APA
Li, D., Wang, H., & Ye, J. (2026). Design, comparison and selection of two competition incentive mechanisms. PLOS One, 21(4), e0345083. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0345083
Vancouver
Li D, Wang H, Ye J. Design, comparison and selection of two competition incentive mechanisms. PLOS One. 2026;21(4):e0345083. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0345083
BibTeX
@article{Li2026,
author = {Li, Dahai and Wang, Huan and Ye, Jingcheng},
title = {Design, comparison and selection of two competition incentive mechanisms},
journal = {PLOS One},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {e0345083},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0345083}
}
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