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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry

Min Yang, Anqi Li iD, Yang Yang iD

PLOS One · 2026

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0341467 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2026. Verfasst von Min Yang und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Economics and Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Commerce, Economic Competition, Product Labeling, Information Dissemination. Die Arbeit nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Yunnan Minzu University 2025 Youth Research Project.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Big data systems enhance retailers’ predictive capabilities, providing them with a significant advantage in understanding end-market demand, increasing the competitiveness of retailers’ private labels, and significantly impacting manufacturers’ sales strategies. This paper applies dynamic game-theoretic models to explore the interaction between the retailer’s information-sharing strategies and the manufacturer’s sales mode selections when the retailer introduces a private label. Through backward induction, the equilibrium strategies of both parties can be derived. The results show that the manufacturer consistently benefits from information-sharing under both sales modes, potentially achieving a win-win outcome under the agency selling mode. Improving the retailer’s information forecast accuracy encourages a shift from reselling to agency selling mode. The retailer’s lower information forecast accuracy or the smaller demand variance offers no first-mover advantage to either the manufacturer or the retailer. Additionally, an Information Compensation Mechanism (ICM) for revenue-sharing is proposed, and contract conditions across different sales modes are discussed.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

CommerceEconomic CompetitionProduct LabelingInformation DisseminationGame TheoryHumans

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Economics and Management, China Three Gorges University, Yichang, China.
  • Business School, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, United Kingdom.
  • School of Economics and Management, Yunnan Minzu University, Kunming, China.

ORCID-Profile: Anqi Li, Yang Yang

Förderung

  • Yunnan Minzu University 2025 Youth Research Project

Zitieren

APA

Yang, M., Li, A., & Yang, Y. (2026). Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0341467

Vancouver

Yang M, Li A, Yang Y. Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry. PLOS One. 2026. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0341467

BibTeX
@article{Yang2026,
  author = {Yang, Min and Li, Anqi and Yang, Yang},
  title = {Reselling or agency selling? Sales mode selection for a manufacturer in private label competition under information asymmetry},
  journal = {PLOS One},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0341467}
}
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