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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

The influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on Public-Private Partnership project investment from a political-performance-driven perspective: Empirical evidence from China

Lisha Zhang iD, Mingyang Yue iD, Shasha Du, Rong Zheng, Tao Zhu, Boyuan Tang

PLOS One · 2026

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0337404 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2026. Verfasst von Lisha Zhang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Marxism, Hubei Communications Technical College, Wuhan, Hubei, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Public-Private Sector Partnerships, Motivation, Politics, Investments. Die Arbeit nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Hubei Provincial Department of Education, Jiangsu Federation of Philosophy and Social Science, National Party Schools of C.P.C..

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The investment in PPP projects in China is large but quite uneven. Based on the political economy theory, using data from the public‒private partnership (PPP) industry issued by local municipal authorities from 2014 to 2018 in China, this paper explains the phenomenon of uneven PPP investment from a politically performance-driven perspective. The study shows that local officials have a strong incentive to increase investment in PPP projects that have positive visual effects on performance appraisal. Driven by promotion incentive, PPP investment demonstrates a phenomenon of “emphasizing performance over livelihood” and “emphasizing aboveground over underground”. The correlation between promotion incentives for municipal party secretaries and the annual incremental investment amount in growth-based PPP categories has an inverted U-shaped curve. Furthermore, the age of mayors has a heterogeneous influence on PPP investment, with those under 52 years of age being more willing to increase investment in growth-based PPP categories, as well as growth-based-visible PPP categories. Our study explores the political reasons for project investment mismatch and reveals the negative effect of local officials’ promotion incentives, which provides empirical experience in China for other countries to explore the relationship between officials’ promotion incentives and project investment.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Public-Private Sector PartnershipsMotivationPoliticsInvestmentsChinaHumansMiddle Aged

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Marxism, Hubei Communications Technical College, Wuhan, Hubei, People's Republic of China.
  • Department of Economics, Jiangsu Administration Institute, Nanjing, Jiangsu, People's Republic of China.
  • School of Social and Public Administration, Lingnan Normal University, Zhanjiang, People's Republic of China.

ORCID-Profile: Lisha Zhang, Mingyang Yue

Förderung

  • Hubei Provincial Department of Education
  • Jiangsu Federation of Philosophy and Social Science
  • National Party Schools of C.P.C.

Zitieren

APA

Zhang, L., Yue, M., Du, S., Zheng, R., Zhu, T., & Tang, B. (2026). The influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on Public-Private Partnership project investment from a political-performance-driven perspective: Empirical evidence from China. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0337404

Vancouver

Zhang L, Yue M, Du S, Zheng R, Zhu T, Tang B. The influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on Public-Private Partnership project investment from a political-performance-driven perspective: Empirical evidence from China. PLOS One. 2026. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0337404

BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
  author = {Zhang, Lisha and Yue, Mingyang and Du, Shasha and Zheng, Rong and Zhu, Tao and Tang, Boyuan},
  title = {The influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on Public-Private Partnership project investment from a political-performance-driven perspective: Empirical evidence from China},
  journal = {PLOS One},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0337404}
}
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