The orchestrating role of platform enterprises in digital inclusion: A network game perspective from industrial clusters
PLOS One · 01.04.2026 · 21 (4) · e0336724
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0336724 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, online erschienen am 01.04.2026. Verfasst von Dingteng Wang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Business, Guangxi City Vocational University, Chongzuo, Guangxi, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Industry. Die Arbeit nennt 89 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Guangxi Association for Science and Technology, Education Department of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The digital transformation of industrial clusters, while enhancing productivity, has exacerbated the corporate digital divide, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Digital inclusion, which aims to bridge this divide, exhibits public-good attributes and positive externalities, yet its co-construction is often hindered by the “Olson’s dilemma” arising from the conflict between individual and collective rationality. Platform enterprises, occupying the “bridging point” of structural holes within clusters, are posited to act as opinion leaders capable of orchestrating ecosystem co-creation. Through a theoretical simulation approach, there employs a “small-world + opinion leader” complex network framework to model the evolutionary dynamics of digital inclusion ecosystem co-construction. Integrating a public goods game model with a Fermi learning algorithm enhanced by a random surfer mechanism, we simulate strategic interactions among cluster firms under controlled parameter conditions. Monte Carlo simulations reveal a distinct threshold effect under simulated conditions: cooperation emerges sustainably only when the investment return coefficient surpasses the critical value defined by the number of game participants. Furthermore, the platform’s connection ratio and strategic commitment emerge as pivotal factors; maintaining an investment strategy significantly promotes cooperation, whereas free-riding by the platform exerts a strong negative demonstration effect. While traditional platform governance tools like rewards and punishments can mitigate cooperation decay, they cannot reverse collective free-riding trends in our model. Crucially, a binding collective agreement, featuring pre-commitment of costs and redistribution of unused funds, emerges as the most effective mechanism for resolving the cooperation dilemma within the simulation. These theoretically derived findings offer insights for policymakers, platform enterprises, and SMEs in fostering collaborative and inclusive digital ecosystems within industrial clusters, though empirical validation remains necessary.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Business, Guangxi City Vocational University, Chongzuo, Guangxi, China.
- School of Business, Guangxi University, Nanning, Guangxi, China.
- The School of Management, Guangxi University for Nationalities, Guangxi, China.
ORCID-Profile: Dingteng Wang
Förderung
- Guangxi Association for Science and Technology
- Education Department of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Zitieren
APA
Wang, D., Li, N., Liang, G., & Li, S. (2026). The orchestrating role of platform enterprises in digital inclusion: A network game perspective from industrial clusters. PLOS One, 21(4), e0336724. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0336724
Vancouver
Wang D, Li N, Liang G, Li S. The orchestrating role of platform enterprises in digital inclusion: A network game perspective from industrial clusters. PLOS One. 2026;21(4):e0336724. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0336724
BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
author = {Wang, Dingteng and Li, Ningning and Liang, Guoan and Li, Shengming},
title = {The orchestrating role of platform enterprises in digital inclusion: A network game perspective from industrial clusters},
journal = {PLOS One},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {e0336724},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0336724}
}
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