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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Matrix games between full siblings in Mendelian populations

József Garay, Tamás Varga iD, Villő Csiszár, Tamás F Móri, András Szilágyi

PLOS One · 2025

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331044 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2025. Verfasst von József Garay und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: HUN-REN Centre for Ecological Research, Institute of Evolution, Budapest, Hungary. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Siblings, Models, Genetic. Die Arbeit nennt 61 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Bolyai János Research Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, National Research, Development and Innovation Office in Hungary.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We develop a model that integrates evolutionary matrix game theory with Mendelian genetics. Within this framework, we define the genotype dynamics that describes how the frequencies of genotypes change in sexual diploid populations. We show that our formal definition of evolutionary stability for genotype distributions implies the stability of the corresponding interior equilibrium point in the genotype dynamics. We apply our findings to a model of familial selection, where the survival rates of siblings in monogamous families are determined by a matrix game between them. According to Mendelian inheritance, the behaviour associated with each genotype is uniquely determined by an autosomal (recessive-dominant or intermediate) allele pair. We provide general conditions for the evolutionary stability of homozygote populations. We find that the payoff matrix and the genotype-phenotype map together determine this stability. In numerical examples we consider the prisoner’s dilemma between siblings. Based on the evolutionary stability of the pure cooperator and defector states, we provide a potential classification of the genotype dynamics. We distinguish between two cases: one in which the total survival rate is higher in cooperator-cooperator interactions (“coordinated” case), and another in which it is higher in cooperator-defector interactions (“anti-coordinated” case). In the coordinated case, global stability of cooperator homozygote population is possible but not necessary, since bistability, stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors, and even global stability of the defector homozygote state are all possible, depending on the interaction between the phenotypic payoff matrix and the genotype-phenotype mapping. In the anti-coordinated case, the cooperator homozygote population cannot be stable. Thus, similarly to the group selection theory, the welfare of the family (the sum of the survival rates of siblings) governs the emergence of cooperative behavior among family members. Finally, in the case of the donation game, the classical Hamilton’s rule determines whether the homozygous cooperator or the homozygous defector population is stable; bistability or stable coexistence are impossible.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheorySiblingsModels, GeneticHumansGenotypeBiological EvolutionPhenotypeGenetics, Population

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • HUN-REN Centre for Ecological Research, Institute of Evolution, Budapest, Hungary.
  • Bolyai Institute, University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary.
  • National Laboratory for Health Security, University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary.
  • Department of Probability Theory and Statistics, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary.
  • HUN-REN Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics, Budapest, Hungary.

ORCID-Profile: Tamás Varga

Förderung

  • Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office
  • Bolyai János Research Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
  • National Research, Development and Innovation Office in Hungary
  • Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund

Zitieren

APA

Garay, J., Varga, T., Csiszár, V., Móri, T. F., & Szilágyi, A. (2025). Matrix games between full siblings in Mendelian populations. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0331044

Vancouver

Garay J, Varga T, Csiszár V, Móri TF, Szilágyi A. Matrix games between full siblings in Mendelian populations. PLOS One. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0331044

BibTeX
@article{Garay2025,
  author = {Garay, József and Varga, Tamás and Csiszár, Villő and Móri, Tamás F and Szilágyi, András},
  title = {Matrix games between full siblings in Mendelian populations},
  journal = {PLOS One},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0331044}
}
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