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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Modeling and simulation of railway safety management with public supervision and dynamic incentives: A four-party evolutionary game and system dynamics approach

Xiaoxi Li iD, Xueru Cao, Jinyan Deng, Xinyuan Li

PLOS One · 2025

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0330100 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2025. Verfasst von Xiaoxi Li und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Jiangxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Comprehensive Stereoscopic Traffic Information Perception and Fusion, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang, …. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Railroads, Safety Management, Models, Theoretical. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, Jiangxi Province early vocational young scientific and technological personnel training program.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Railway accidents pose a significant threat to the industry, necessitating enhanced research into railway transportation safety. This study integrated a public oversight framework into the existing safety governance structure of railway transport operators, utilizing a four-party evolutionary game model and system dynamics for enhancement. Simulations conducted with Vensim software demonstrate that increased public supervision increases safety operation rates and improves the safety-related productivity of auxiliary enterprises. However, uncertainties in the evolutionary strategy process were identified. To address equilibrium fluctuations, a dynamic reward-punishment mechanism was developed. The optimized system achieved a safety operation rate of 99.7%, enhanced the safety-related productivity of the auxiliary enterprises to 93.2%, and increased the public supervision rate to 87.2%. These findings indicate that effective public participation and dynamic incentives can significantly improve safety management and prevent losses in railway sectors, offering valuable theoretical and practical insights for global railway enterprises.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

RailroadsSafety ManagementModels, TheoreticalHumansGame TheoryComputer SimulationMotivation

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Jiangxi Provincial Key Laboratory of Comprehensive Stereoscopic Traffic Information Perception and Fusion, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang, China.
  • School of Transportation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang, China.
  • School of Tianyou, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang, China.

ORCID-Profile: Xiaoxi Li

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
  • Jiangxi Province early vocational young scientific and technological personnel training program

Zitieren

APA

Li, X., Cao, X., Deng, J., & Li, X. (2025). Modeling and simulation of railway safety management with public supervision and dynamic incentives: A four-party evolutionary game and system dynamics approach. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0330100

Vancouver

Li X, Cao X, Deng J, Li X. Modeling and simulation of railway safety management with public supervision and dynamic incentives: A four-party evolutionary game and system dynamics approach. PLOS One. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0330100

BibTeX
@article{Li2025,
  author = {Li, Xiaoxi and Cao, Xueru and Deng, Jinyan and Li, Xinyuan},
  title = {Modeling and simulation of railway safety management with public supervision and dynamic incentives: A four-party evolutionary game and system dynamics approach},
  journal = {PLOS One},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0330100}
}
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